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ELECTION OF REMEDIES IN TEXAS
Leslie C. Merrem*
T SHALL be our purpose, in writing this article, to discuss
the essentials of the doctrine of election of remedies and its
application by the courts of Texas and to present some of the
problems raised in connection therewith; to determine, if possible,
when a party by electing some one remedy precludes himself from
pursuing another; and to attempt whenever possible to eliminate
some of the confusion resulting from the application of the doc-
trine to various situations. It shall not be our purpose to cover
the entire field, as that would be beyond the scope of an article
of this nature; however, since the doctrine is so frequently invoked
in the cases involving contracts induced by fraud, special atten-
tion will be given to that field.
The doctrine of election of remedies, which has been a problem
child of the law for many years, may be stated simply as that
doctrine of the law which holds that a party having more than
one remedy growing out of the same right of action is bound by
the remedy he elects to pursue.' Again, it has been said, "An
election arises when one having two co-existent remedies chooses
to exercise one, in which event he loses the right to thereafter
exercise the other.
' 2
*Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law; member of the Texas Bar.
1 Moseley v. Fikes, 126 S.W. 2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
2 Mosher Mfg. Co. v. Eastland W. F. & G. Ry. Co., 259 S.W. 253 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924) er. rel.
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For the doctrine to apply, it is well settled that the party electing
must have had, in fact, two or more remedies inconsistent with one
another; that they were all available remedies and he, with full
knowledge of the facts, selected one to the exclusion of the others.
If one remedy was not, in fact, available, he is not bound. His
supposition that he had a remedy and his effort to enforce it do
not constitute an election unless the remedy does, in fact, exist.8
If, for example,' the remedy is not available because it is barred
for failure to act in time, an attempt to pursue it does not consti-
tute a binding election."
Clearly, if the remedies are concurrent rather than inconsistent,
the pursuit of one will not preclude the other unless judgment is
entered, or grounds for estoppel exist.' If there is, in fact, an elec-
tion, however, the fact that at the time the election was made, the
party "reserved the right" to pursue another available remedy, is
immaterial. The election is just as binding as if no such attempted
reservation had been made.'
Further, in electing, in order to be bound, the party must know
the facts. The rule is not inflexible. One definite qualification is
that the party is not concluded in selecting a remedy unless he
made it with knowledge, or means of knowledge of the facts.
However, when one has selected a remedy in ignorance of the
facts from which his rights arise, he will not be permitted there-
after to adopt a different remedy if by that procedure substantial
injury will result to an innocent party.'
In a proper case third parties may take advantage of the elec-
tion.' This is particularly true when the act of election will injure
the third party.
3 Bandy v. Cates, 97 S.W. 710 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) er. ref.
4 Poe v. Continental Oil and Cotton Co., 231 S.W. 717 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921).
' Rick v. Farrell, 266 S.W. 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
e Mosher Mfg. Co. v. Eastland W. F. & G. Ry. Co., 259 S.W. 253 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924) er. ref.
7 Slay v. Burnett Trust, 143 Tex. 621, 187 S.W. 2d 377 (1945).




The reasoning upon which the doctrine of election is based is
simply that the courts will not permit one to affirm the existence
of a certain fact situation entitling him to certain rights and relief
and then change his position completely and assert an entirely
contrary state of facts in order to set up a claim to an entirely
different type of relief.
Nearly all of those who have written on the subject of election
of remedies and the court decisions in that field state that much
of the confusion existing is due to a failure to distinguish between
election of rights and election of remedies. We have failed to
find in any of the major texts, or in any of the decisions, a satis-
factory discussion of the distinctions between the two. Few rules
have been laid down to guide us. All tell us that the distinction
must be made, but none tell us just how the distinction is to be
made. One Texas Commission of Appeals case' did say, however,
that "[o]ne is a choice between inconsistent substantive rights
while the other is a choice between forms of action or procedure."
This is certainly as clear a statement as one can get from any
of the authorities.
It occurs to us that the following may be a possible method of
distinguishing between the two: If the election is between ends
to be attained, then it is an election of rights. If, however, the
election is between two means or methods of attaining the same
end, as where there is a choosing between the posting of notices
under the power in a deed of trust foreclosure and a foreclosure
of the deed of trust lien in court, this is but an election between
remedies and usually will have to be pursued to a conclusion to
be binding. But if it is an election between different types of
redress, as where a debtor sets up a trust fund from which his
creditors are to be paid proportionately, and a creditor elects to
sue for his debt and run writ of garnishment against the fund
instead, this is in the nature of an election of rights, and once hay-
9 Seamans Oil Co. v. Guy, 262 S. W. 473, 474 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
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ing elected, he is bound. From one point of view, this may appear
to be an election of remedies because the creditor is electing
between two methods of collecting his debt. But actually there is a
distinction in that in the one case he accepts the trust fund created
for his benefit and in the other he rejects it.
Prior to Rick v. Farrell"0 the right to affirm or disaffirm in cases
where a contract was induced by fraud was often used as an
illustration of a binding election of rights-that is, between the
rights to declare the contract valid or to declare it invalid, and this
certainly seems sound. But the cited case, in keeping with prob-
ably a majority of the decisions in the United States, held that,
while an election to affirm by bringing suit was binding, a suit
to disaffirm was not binding until pursued to judgment. It seems
that they should both be classed as election of rights, but if they
are, the above rule is well established now in any event. Like-
wise, one certainly would not say that in all elections between
pure remedies the election is not binding unless pursued to a con-
clusion. The decisions do not make it that simple.
In discussing what constitutes an election, one must keep in
mind certain fundamental principles hereinbefore mentioned,
such as: that the elector must have had an actual choice of
remedies that were in fact inconsistent, and that he must actually
have selected one to the exclusion of the others. He must have
made his choice with knowledge of the facts, and such remedies
must have been in fact available to him.1 In the event the remedy
in fact does not exist, as for example, where in a workmen's com-
pensation case action is brought under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law after limitation has run, this will not constitute an elec-
tion because two remedies were not available. In holding that such
was not binding, one of our courts said, ". ..[I]t is equally as
illogical to hold that a man would waive a valid remedy for a non-
10 266 S.W. 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
11 Bandy v. Cates, 97 S. W. 710 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) er. ref.
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enforceable one as it would be to say that he elected an unenforce-
able remedy and waived a valid right.' ' 2
Probably the greatest confusion in the whole subject of election
of remedies lies in determining what constitutes an election. Is a
mere demand based on one remedy sufficient, or must suit be insti-
tuted, and still further, if suit is instituted, must it be pursued to
judgment to be binding? We shall find the rules difficult to estab-
lish with clarity. In fact, while the rules are many times glibly
stated, an examination of the cases will seem to show that it is
almost impossible to lay down general rules. For example, mere
filing of suit in affirmance of a contract will be binding, whereas
suit to rescind under the identical state of facts is not binding
until pursued to a conclusion,' 8 and again, there is always an
attempt to distinguish between election of rights and election of
remedies. The Texas Commission of Appeals 4 has quoted, with
approval, from Ruling Case Law, as follows: ".... [I]f one having
a right to pursue one of several inconsistent remedies makes his
election, institutes suit and prosecutes it to final judgment or
receives anything of value under the claim thus asserted, or if the
other party has been affected adversely, such election constitutes
an estoppel thereafter to pursue another and inconsistent remedy.
And where the right in the subsequent suit is inconsistent with
that set up in the former suit, as distinguished from a merely
inconsistent remedy, the party is estopped though the former suit
may not have proceeded to judgment. But where the inconsistency
is in the remedies it is generally considered that there is no
estoppel where the former suit was dismissed without trial or
before judgment."' 5
While one may safely say that in Texas the general rule is that
mere bringing of an action which has been dismissed before judg-
12 Poe v. Continental Oil & Cotton Co., 231 S.W. 717, 720 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921).
13 Rick v. Farrell, 266 S.W. 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
14 Seamans Oil Co. v. Guy, 262 S.W. 473, 474 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
15 10 R.C.L., Estoppel, pp. 703, 704.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ment in which no advantage has been gained or legal detriment
occasioned is not an election, 6 nevertheless there are other
exceptions besides the one in which the mere institution of suit
to affirm a contract induced by fraud will be held binding. As
before noted, where a debtor sets up a fund in escrow for the
benefit of his creditors and a creditor ignores the fund and insti-
tutes garnishment proceedings against the holder of the fund,
institution of the garnishment proceedings, with knowledge of the
facts, binds the party not to accept the benefits of the contract,
though the garnishment proceeding is dismissed before judgment.17
And it has been held that where the injured employee files his
suit for damages at common law, he makes an election and the
fact that he subsequently presents a claim to the Industrial Acci-
dent Board does not estop him from prosecuting the suit based on
his common law remedy.'
8
But it has also been held that where the vendor in a land purchase
contract first sued for specific performance but dismissed before
a hearing thereon, this would not constitute such an election of
remedies as to preclude him from suing in a later action for the
difference between the contract price and the sum realized from
the sale of the property. 9
It has also been held that where the vendor accepted the note of
a third party in part payment for the conveyance of land, and the
vendor then sued to set aside the sale on the ground of fraud and
lost, this would not preclude such vendor from then bringing suit
against such third party on the note.20
And the Texas Supreme Court, in at least one case, held that
the filing of suit asking for a decree of foreclosure is not such an
election of remedies as precludes the plaintiff from amending his
16 Adami v. Robinson, 299 S.W. 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
17 Commercial Loan & Trust Co. v. Reed Automobile Co., 75 S.W. 2d 144 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934) er. dism.
18 Rice v. Garrett, 194 S.W. 667 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) er. rel.
19 Brodkey v. Lesser, 157 S.W. 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
20 Crutcher v. Eaves, 259 S.W. 970 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) er. dism.
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petition and seeking recovery of the land."' In deed of trust fore-
closure cases where foreclosure may be had either under the power
in the instrument or in court, while the commencement of fore-
closure under one method will not preclude a withdrawal of that
method and institution of proceedings under the other, neverthe-
less they cannot be pursued concurrently. Posting of notices cannot
be started until the suit is withdrawn.2 In a Missouri decision it
was held that even though the case is pursued to judgment, there
is no election if the judgment is later set aside.28
It might be noted here, however, that there is no question of
election of remedies involved where the suit is filed and then dis-
missed and re-filed in another court. This is no more than a change
in choice of courts.
2 4
In any event, a study of the cases discussed above will clearly
show that it is impossible to form any clear rule as to when insti-
tution of suit constitutes a binding election and when it does not.
And of course, it must be remembered that several suits may
grow out of the same transaction and may be pursued- at the
same time, if they are consistent with each other. The doctrine of
election applies only when there is an election between inconsist-
ent remedies.
Of course, while one of the most decisive acts in the matter of
election is the institution of suit, it is possible for acts short of
suit to constitute an election. Undoubtedly any positive act on
the part of a defrauded person that he intends to affirm the con-
tract and sue for damages will be binding.2" There is authority
indicating that the mere presentation of a claim to the Industrial
Accident Board will preclude the claimant from later withdrawing
21 Stone Cattle & Pasture Co. v. Boon, 73 Tex. 548, 11 S.W. 544 (1889).
22 Gandy v. Cameron State Bank, 2 S.W. 2d 971 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) er. ref.
23 Brayton v. Grumby, 267 S.W. 450 (Mo. App. 1924).
24 Wiley v. Joiner, 223 S.W. 2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
25 Pope v. Clendenen, 257 S.W. 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ; 5 WItLISTON, CONTRACTS
(Rev. ed. 1937) § 1527.
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it and suing at common law for damages. 26 But certainly it may
be safely said that mere demand short of suit is not usually
a binding election.27
We now come to the problem presented by the contract fraud
cases, the situation wherein the doctrine of election of remedies
probably has its most frequent application. It is elemental that
when a person is induced to enter into a contract by the fraudu-
lent representations of the other party, he has his option to affirm
the contract and sue in an action at law for damages suffered be-
cause of the fraudulent representations, or he may sue in equity
to rescind the contract and demand the return of the considera-
tion paid. Such contracts are not void. At most, they are voidable.
It is in the discretion of the defrauded one to rescind the contract
if he wishes, but he is not required to do so. If after discovering
the fraud he elects to let the contract stand, that is his privilege.
If he desires to set it aside, that too is his privilege, but since
this is an equitable action, he must act with diligence after dis-
covery of the fraud. If he elects to let the contract stand and sue
for damages, since the action is one at law, he need only guard
against the running of limitations. It is the defrauded one's option
to choose either remedy, but it is obvious he cannot have both.
He cannot both affirm the contract and repudiate it. As has been
aptly said, 2 he has his "right to affirm the invalidity of the contract
on account of fraud ... or he. . . [has] the right to affirm its valid-
ity and receive the benefits thereunder. These rights ... [are]
wholly inconsistent." On the one hand plaintiff takes the position
that there is a valid and existing contract between the parties and
on the other that because of the fraud no binding contract was
entered into and he is refusing to be bound by it.
In keeping with this idea, it has been held that one cannot
bring a suit to rescind a contract of conveyance for fraud and at
26 Rice v. Garrett, 194 S.W. 667 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) er. ref.
.27 Clemenger v. Flesher, 185 S.W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) er. ref.
28 Seamans Oil Co. v. Guy, 262 S.W. 473, 474 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
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the same time recover damages for wrongful sequestration of the
premises in question. 9 By disaffirmance of the sale, he waived
his right of possession and therefore cannot complain of the act
of the other party in taking possession. He cannot yield the right
of possession and at the same time recover damages for the loss
of that possession.
As has been previously indicated, there is a question of whether
election in cases such as these is in fact an election of rights as
indicated by the Guy case,80 since it may be argued that it is
but an election of remedies because the fraud committed is a
tort and plaintiff is primarily thinking of how he may redress
his wrong." But the Texas courts seem to indicate it is an election
of rights although the words "rights" and "remedies" are too
often used interchangeably."
The rule that plaintiff must have two available inconsistent
remedies when he makes his choice, of course, applies also in the
contract fraud cases. Where for any reason the remedy elected to
be pursued is not available, there simply is no election. For exam-
ple, where one has been induced to part with his land because
of the fraudulent representations of the vendee, and the vendee
has reconveyed the land to an innocent purchaser, and the de-
frauded vendor then brings his suit to set aside the sale, he can,
of course, amend and confirm the sale and ask for damages against
the vendor because the action for recission was not available to
him.88 His supposition that he had a remedy and his efforts to
enforce it are simply immaterial.
There is a well-settled distinction, however, between suits to
rescind and suits to affirm so far as election of remedies is con-
cerned. Where the complaining party commences a suit for
29 Gustafson v. American Land Co., 234 S.W. 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
SO Seamans Oil Co. v. Guy, cited supra note 28.
31 See Note, 36 Calif. L. Rev. 636 (1948).
32 See 5 WILISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1528.
33 Griffin v. Williams, 142 S.W. 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
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damages resulting from fraud, this is an affirmance of the contract,
an election of a substantive right, and he cannot later sue to
rescind. 4 He alone has been harmed by the fraud and he, with-
out the concurrence of the other party, should have the right to
say that the contract shall remain in force.85 Once he brings his
action to affirm, he is bound by it. It requires no concurring agree-
ment by the other party. The mere act of bringing suit for damages
is, of itself, a ratification of the contract between the parties. But
this is not true in the case of rescission. It takes the concurrence
of both to rescind, or it takes the final judgment of a court order-
ing rescission, 6 and the mere filing of suit to rescind is not a
binding election and will not prevent a later withdrawal and suit
for damages. Only when the action to rescind is pursued to final
judgment is the action to rescind binding. The Dallas Court of
Civil Appeals, in the case of Rick v. Farrell,7 sets out the above
rule very clearly. When suit to rescind is filed first, the remedies
are not inconsistent, for it is only when the suit is filed affirming
and suing for damages that the right to rescind is precluded by
reason of affirmance of the contract. The rights of the parties in
so far as affirmance of the contract is concerned remain the same
on filing suit for rescission, the injured party being left free to
abandon that action at any time before judgment and institute on
the same state of facts his suit for damages suffered on account
of the fraud. When pursued in this order, the remedies are not
inconsistent, but alternative and concurrent, and the doctrine of
election of remedies has no application.
Mr. Williston, in his renowned work on Contracts, 3 explains this
as follows: "These courts generally treat the rescission action
rather as an indication that the defrauded party has refrained from
34 Rick v. Farrell, 266 S.W. 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
-3 See Note, 35 A.L.R. 1153 (1925).
s6 Rick v. Farrell, cited supra note 34; Gorman-Head Motor Co. v. Barrett, 78 Okla.
34, 188 Pac. 1083 (1920).
3T Cited supra note 34.
38 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1528.
[Vol. 8
ELECTION OF REMEDIES
making a choice, preferring to submit to the court the determina-
tion of the right to disaffirm, and that there is, therefore, no con-
clusive election until judgment on the merits." Regardless of the
reasoning back of the rule, it seems to be fairly well established.
It is conceded that the above rule is subject to criticism. There
simply is little reasoning behind the rule that one is bound by an
election to affirm, but not by an election to disaffirm.
It has been noted by Professor Williston"9 that there may be
cases where a party may rescind the contract obtained through
fraud, and still be the loser. The defrauding party may be in-
solvent. He often is. Plaintiff is faced with the dilemma of recov-
ering the consideration that is still in the hands of his adversary,
which may be a sure thing, and having to ignore his losses, sus-
tained by his reliance on what appeared to be a fair and legal
contract, or suing in tort for his damages and getting a judgment
for the full amount thereof, only to find that it is not collectible.
This learned author calls attention to the fact that in such cases
the plaintiff may want to rescind the contract obtained through
fraud and still desire to sue for damages and says that such relief
"will generally be allowed." Doubtless such should be the law.
English cases seem to support the idea,4" and there are some Massa-
chusetts cases that are inclined to allow it,4 but this will not likely
be followed in those states which apply the doctrine strictly.
In one Texas case,42 wherein plaintiff was induced to part with
his land through fraud and the court permitted him in a suit to
cancel the sale not only to recover his land but to recover damages
for the use of his land as well, the court said: "We overrule the
further contention by counsel for Mooneyham that damages for
fraud could not be awarded in the same suit for cancellation of
the two deeds. We know of no reason why the general rule which
39 WILLISTON, SALES (Rev. ed. 1948) § 648c.
40 Mondel v. Steel, 8 M.&W. 585, 151 Eng. Rep. 1288 (Ex. 1841).
41 Cook v. Castner, 63 Mass. 266 (1852). See Note, 38 Col. L. Rev. 888 (1938).
42 Mooneyham v. Cornick, 294 S.W. 894, 899 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
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favors a settlement of the entire controversy in the same suit
under our blended system of law and equity should not apply in
this case, and this conclusion applies also to the recovery of the
rental value of the land during the time Mooneyham has held
and enjoyed the possession of it."
There are other exceptions of this nature, but undoubtedly as a
general rule in Texas, one cannot both rescind the contract and
sue for damages for its breach.43
Sections 69 (c) and (d) of the Uniform Sales Act, though deal-
ing primarily with breach of warranty, would indicate that the
defrauded person must elect to affirm or disaffirm and cannot dis-
affirm and also sue for damages.
While probably not technically in the class of contract fraud
cases, a situation close akin to it is that class of cases wherein an
employee, against whom the employer has protected himself with
a surety bond, issues checks to fictitious persons, endorses them
with the fictitious names and collects the money himself. Some
courts, and it is believed they represent the weight of opinion in
the United States,44 have indicated that in such situation the de-
frauded employer may either demand payment of the amount of
the checks from the drawee bank on the theory that the bank paid
the checks on a forged endorsement and therefore paid out its
own money, or he may affirm the action of the bank in paying out
on the forged endorsement and, on the ground that the employee
embezzled the money belonging to the employer, collect on the
employee's surety bond. The contention is that in the first situation
the employer takes the position that his money is still in the bank
and in the second that the employer's money came into the hands
of the employee and he embezzled it, and that if the employer
takes the position that the money has been embezzled and makes
claim against the surety company, he or the surety company
43 Gustafson v. American Land Co., 234 S.W. 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
44 U. S. F. & G. v. First National Bank in Dallas, 172 F. 2d 258 (5th Cir. 1949).
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under subrogation cannot make claim against the bank, because if
the money was embezzled by the employee, it cannot still be in
the bank.
Prior to 1951 there were no Texas cases in point, but in that
year the supreme court made it clear that where the employer
makes claim against the surety company and also makes demand
against the bank, there is no binding election of remedies, indicat-
ing that the employer's position is not that of the holder of a claim
against two indemnitors, where payment of damages by the one
would be off-set in a suit against the other, but a claim, first,
against an insurer and, second, against the bank refusing to pay
money in violation of its contract. 45 The remedies are, therefore,
not in the same right. The insurance is not "in ease of the bank's
mistake," and it would be taking an unusual position to say that
an insurance contract could reach out to indemnify a stranger not
a party to the insurance contract whose wrongful act caused the
insurance company to pay the loss to the insured. Certainly the
employer for whose benefit the insurance was taken might sue
either the bank or the bonding company. Upon being indemnified,
the employer certainly could assign his claim against the bank to
the indemnity company. Those cases that deny the insurance com-
pany the right to pursue the insured's claim do so on the theory
that the surety stands in the shoes of the employer and the em-
ployer having pursued his claim against the surety and collected
it cannot now proceed against the bank because this would be
permitting the insured a double recovery. But, of course, there
is no double recovery if the suit is brought for the benefit of the
insurance company instead of the insured. There is no estoppel as
the bank has not been prejudiced in any way. The position of the
employer in making claim against the surety company is that by
virtue of the act of the employee the bank was induced to pay out
its own money, but that the bank had wrongfully charged the




checks against the employer's account. Until the bank restored
this, the employer has suffered a loss. Such contention is wholly
consistent with the position taken that the bank has paid. out its
own funds and not those of the employer. The positions being con-
sistent, there is no election of remedies.
The question sometimes arises as to whether exemplary damages
may be collected in contract fraud cases where there is a suit for
rescission. It is certainly the general rule that an action for
exemplary damages cannot be based on a mere breach of con-
tract. But this rule obviously should apply only to cases where
actual binding contracts are involved and not fraudulent fictions.
Where one is allowed to waive a tort and sue in assumpsit, in
cases such as theft, the obligation is really not contractual." But
even in the case of express contracts, exemplary damages may be
recovered when the wrong complained of constitutes both a breach
of contract and a tort accompanied by fraud, malice or oppres-
sion.47 By analogy exemplary damages should also be allowed
when the act giving rise to a fictitious contract amounts to a will-
ful tort. It was early pointed out by the Texas Supreme Court
that a plaintiff does not waive his right to exemplary damages by
suing for the return of the consideration he had parted with be-
cause of fraud or duress."' Though the main purpose of the suit
may be to cancel the contract and recover the consideration, still
since fraud is shown as the basis for the cancellation, exemplary
damages may be recovered.49
And one may add that it is obvious that where the defrauded
party, with full knowledge of the facts, enters into a new agree-
ment adjusting his differences with the defrauder, any cause of
action against the defrauding one is waived.50
46 See Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit, 19 Yale L. J. 221 (1910).
47 G. C. & S. F. v. Levy, 59 Tex. 542 (1883).
4s Oliver v. Chapman, 15 Tex. 400 (1855).
49 Briggs v. Rodriguez, 236 S.W. 2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) er. ref. n. r. e.
50 Risley v. McAdams, 108 S.W. 2d 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
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The defense of election of remedies should be specially pleaded
and proved. It must be brought to the attention of the trial court
at the proper time, for without pleading and proof, the defense
will not prevail.5
Rule 94 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, after stating
that a party shall set forth affirmatively fraud, release, res judicata
and several other defenses, adds, "and any other matter constitut-
ing an avoidance or affirmative defense." In the absence of any
cases on the subject, this would be sufficient to require that this
defense be affirmatively set out, but there are numerous cases on
the subject. The plea should allege all of the essentials of an
election, namely, that there were two or more valid, inconsistent
remedies and that plaintiff did elect one of them under such cir-
cumstances as to preclude his right to pursue the others. It cannot
be asserted for the first time on appeal. 2
But when the defendant properly pleads plaintiff's election of
remedies in a prior suit, he still must sustain the burden of proof
on the issue. He will have to introduce in evidence at the hearing
on the plea, the pleadings, evidence, rulings and record generally
in the first suit. Should this evidence fail to show an election, his
plea will, of course, be overruled.5
Should the defendant depend on some act short of filing suit
as the election, then he must allege the act and facts sufficient to
show that the same was an election. It must, of course, be remem-
bered that all of this is still subject to the general rules that plain-
tiff must have had a choice between two available remedies with
full knowledge of the facts, and it must also be remembered that
where the issue is tried without pleadings on the subject, under
Rule 67 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may
hold that the issue was tried by implied consent.
51 Moseley v. Fikes, 126 S.W. 2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Betty v. Tuer, 292
S.W. 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
52 Holland Texas Hypotheek Bank v. Brooks, 266 S.W. 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)
er. ref.
53 See 18 AM. JUR., Election of Remedies, § 53.
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The law covering the subject of election of remedies is definitely
uncertain. In fact, there are few phases of the law more unsettled.
It has been referred to by leading jurists and authors as follows:
"The authorities are by no means harmonious as to what acts
constitute a conclusive election;"54 "Just what acts . . . amount to
an election of a remedy is not always clear;"55 "no decisive rule
seems to exist by which all cases in which the question arises can
be tested;"56 "The doctrine of estoppel by election of inconsistent
rights or remedies does not seem to have been extensively discussed
by the courts of this state, and there is some confusion in the
decisions." 5
We are not inclined to agree with that portion of the last state-
ment to the effect that the matter has not been extensively discussed
by the courts of this state, but we do agree with that portion to
the effect that there is some confusion in the decisions. In fact,
we think there is a great deal of confusion. The author of this
article had hoped to be able to reconcile a lot of discrepancies,
but we realize we have fallen short of our goal. It is simply impos-
sible to reconcile all of the cases. Whether this is due to using the
terms "election of remedies" and "election of rights" interchange-
ably,5" or for other reasons, we cannot say. We do know that the
law is in a state of confusion and has been for a long time, and
it is likely to remain so as long as the doctrine is recognized.
Almost without exception those who have written on the subject
have recommended that the rule be abolished. Mr. J. Leo Roths-
child, commenting on a statement made that the doctrine of elec-
tion of remedies was like a weed recently sprung up in the garden
of the common law, 9 says: "The difficulty was and is, however,
that judicial gardeners do not weed the field of the law. Such is not
54 28 C. J. S., Election of Remedies, p. 1077.
55 18 AM. Jun., Election of Remedies, p. 140.
56 Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 231 S.W. 814, 817 (Tex.. Civ. App. 1921)
er. ref.
57 Seamans Oil Co. v. Guy, 262 S. W. 473, 474 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
58 Id.
59 See Hine, Election of Remedies, A Criticism, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 707 (1913).
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their function. They sow the seeds of legal doctrine-both those
that flower and those which sour. Once planted, however, all re-
ceive similar treatment. Nothing, except in rare instances, is ever
rooted out. Few, indeed, and rare, are the cases expressly over-
ruling prior erroneous decision."" The writer then goes on to
recommend a legislative enactment to abolish the doctrine.
It is unfortunate that in its application the doctrine sometimes
has had harsh results. Technicalities should not hamper justice.
Judge Crane in Clark v. Kirby6 said: "All procedure is merely
a methodical means whereby. the court reaches out to restore
rights and remedy wrongs; it must never become more important
than the purpose which it seeks to accomplish. Unless some neces-
sary requirement has been omitted, a wrong move or mistake in
the method of seeking relief from the courts ought not to furnish
protection for a wrongful act."
Certainly some relief from the confusion and injustices that
sometimes come from application of the doctrine of election is
needed. If this relief cannot come from the courts, and the appli-
cation of the doctrine will probably not be entirely eliminated by
them for some time to come, then we agree with Mr. Rothschild
that it should come by legislative enactment. The right should
always be more important than the means by which it is obtained.
The important thing should never be whether the party has filed
a previous suit and withdrawn it or made a previous demand and
then changed his mind, but whether by such action he gained
some advantage or caused his adversary to suffer some detriment.
If by the filing of suit or making demand the plaintiff has gained
no advantage and defendant has suffered no harm, why should
not the plaintiff be allowed to change his mind and proceed in a
different manner? If plaintiff has gained such advantage or caused
defendant to suffer a disadvantage, then estoppel applies and there
60 A Remedy for Election of Remedies: A Proposed Act to Abolish Election of
Remedies, 14 Cornell L. Rev. 707 (1913).
61243 N.Y. 295, 153 N.E. 79, 82 (1926).
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is again no need for the rule. Ratification will probably take care
of any other situation. In the absence of res adjudicata, ratification
or estoppel, why should plaintiff be bound? It is the wronged party
who brings the suit, and why should he be precluded from chang-
ing his mind when the other party has been put to no disadvan-
tage? The Texas Supreme Court in Slay v. Burnett Trust62 said,
"The doctrine of election of remedies is not a favorite of equity.
It has been said that it 'is a harsh and now largely obsolete rule,
the scope of which should not be extended.' . . . The rule is an
application of the doctrine of the law of estoppel, and it is used
to prevent a double redress for a single Wrong." The rule is indeed
a harsh one and if applied only in cases where the plaintiff is
seeking to take advantage of a technicality, it might be tolerated,
but the rule recognizes no such limited application. A study of
the cases shows that the doctrine often requires the court to
decide in one law suit whether plaintiff might have recovered in
another. We agree with those authors who recommend abandoning
the rule and would like to see the legislature, or the courts, in the
not too distant future abolish it completely.
62 143 Tex. 621, 649, 650, 187 S.W. 2d 377, 393 (1945).
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